Preface

The history of the protracted struggle between the Ottoman empire and the British and their Arab allies for control of Palestine and Syria during the First World War has been dominated by the presence of T.E. Lawrence. The unresolved controversies surrounding Lawrence’s role as a leader of the Arab revolt have ensured that there is a continuing interest in this aspect of the conflict and a stream of publications to support it. But this represents only one dimension of a complex campaign which raises a host of interesting issues about how Britain was drawn into the area, how the war was conducted and what effect it had on imperial interests in the post-war period.

This book provides the first full account in recent times of the whole Palestine campaign and how British and Arab forces worked together eventually to bring about the final collapse of Ottoman authority throughout the Middle East. The starting point for any understanding of these operations and how they were conducted is to examine their relationship to the wider wartime strategy of Turkey and Britain. The changing military priorities of both sides affected their commitment to this theatre, and whether troops were withdrawn or allocated to the Palestine front depended on the course of military events in other areas to which they chose to give greater priority.

This review of grand strategy provides the context for a complete narrative account of the campaign from the first enemy incursions into Egyptian territory in late 1914 to the final Allied dash to Aleppo in the closing stages of the war. The war is examined from the perspective of the opposing commanders and the choices they were faced with. This includes the decision to forge close links between the Allied armies and the leaders of the Arab revolt. The need for effective leadership was clearly an important element in determining the outcome of the campaign but it was not the only one. The