6. The Role of Zionist Ideology

Throughout this analysis thus far, no mention has been made of a single, all-encompassing motive for the exodus. Indeed it is still debatable as to whether there was one, or whether there were several, oft-times conflicting, motives present. However, after the exodus was over, the Israeli government refused, and to this day continues to refuse, to allow any significant repatriation of the Palestinians. If we are to consider Zionist ideology as providing a major motivation for causing the exodus, we must make a significant extrapolation - seeing in the Israeli refusal to permit repatriation the logical outcome of a policy which encouraged the displacement of the Arab population. [55] 

There is evidence that Zionist leaders were already thinking about removal of the indigenous population before the actual occurrence. On February 7, 1948, Ben-Gurion told the Central Committee of Mapai (the largest Zionist political party in Palestine) "it is most probable that in the 6, 8 or 10 coming months of the struggle many great changes will take place, very great in this country and not all of them to our disadvantage, and surely a great change in the composition of the population in the country." [56]

Childers sees the inherent principles of Zionism, necessarily excluding an Arab population from Zionist society, as going back to the very origins of the ideology. One can argue whether the earliest steps which Childers discusses were aimed at the Arabs per se, [57] but it is clear that by the 1930's and into the 1940's, calls for the forcible transfer of Arabs out of Palestine were being made by the Zionist Revisionists and may well have been considered by the more moderate factions too. [58] 

Also beyond dispute is the fact that the 1947 Partition Resolution awarded an area to the Jewish state whose population was 46 percent Arab. Moreover, much of this land was owned by Arabs. [59] It has been argued by the Zionists that they were prepared to make special accommodations for this large population; yet it is difficult to see how such accommodations could have coalesced with their plans for large-scale Jewish immigration; moreover, by August 1, 1948, the Israeli government had already stated that it was "economically unfeasible" to allow the return of the Arabs, at the very time when Jewish refugees were already entering the country and being settled on abandoned Arab property. [60] 

If the ultimate aim of Zionism was to establish a homogeneous Jewish state in Palestine, or at least one with an insignificant Arab minority, then it is almost a certainty that the Zionist leadership came to the conclusion that the mass of Palestinian Arabs would have to be removed from their homes, either forcibly or peacefully. As the Palestinians had never considered abandoning their land to foreigners, the Zionists would have been highly motivated to force them to leave. [61] 

One can question to what extent Zionist ideology played a role in each phase and in each location where the exodus took place. Yet if one looks for a framework in which to understand Zionist actions and reactions, then this factor must be given considerable weight. Furthermore it can be stated with far more certainty that if Zionist ideology did not directly cause the exodus, it has kept it from being resolved, for so long as Israel remains a Zionist state, the readmission of a large Palestinian population is a contradiction in terms.

55 Avnery does not see the exodus as a deliberate policy but does make this point regarding the

return of the Palestinians: "Personally I believe that behind all the arguments against repatriation,

plausible and senseless, there lies the basic ideal of Zionism: a homogeneous Jewish state, "as Jewish as

England is English," as was said many times by Zionist leaders." Avnery, p. 227.

56 Ben-Gurion is quoted in Gabbay, p. 110.

57 Childers' citing of the 1901 Jewish National Fund prohibition on land sales to Arabs and the 1907 boycott of Arab labour as proof of inherent Zionist racism against the native population is debatable. Some historians have argued that these measures were aimed more towards the Jews, to prevent their evolution into an exploitative class, than against the Arab population.

58 See Childers, "The Wordless Wish," pp. 166-77.

59 Childers, "The Other Exodus," p. 675.

60 Kohn, p. 872, states that the Jewish Agency was making special preparations to accommodate a large Arab population in the period before the mass exodus. Childers has questioned this assertion, given Foreign Minister Shertok's claim of "economic unfeasibility" on August 1, 1948, only several months after these provisions were allegedly made. Childers, "The Wordless Wish," p. 196, and "The Other Exodus," p. 673. 

61 This point is made by Sayegh, p. 7 and by Polk et al., who state that "once the notion that Palestine was 'empty derelict land' was exploded and it was realized as it was already in 1919, that the Arab population would never peacefully accept the imposition of Zionism, war and emigration were inevitable. If Palestine were to absorb a million or more Jewish refugees, something would have to give somewhere." Polk, Stamler, Asfour, p. 294.

6. Peran Ideologi Zionis  

Sepanjang analisis ini, belum disebutkan adanya satu motif tunggal yang menyeluruh untuk menjelaskan eksodus Palestina. Masih dapat diperdebatkan apakah memang ada satu motif dominan atau justru terdapat berbagai motif yang seringkali saling bertentangan. Namun, setelah eksodus berakhir, pemerintah Israel menolak, dan hingga kini tetap menolak, memberikan repatriasi dalam jumlah signifikan bagi orang Palestina. Jika ideologi Zionis dipandang sebagai motivasi utama yang mendorong eksodus, maka kita perlu membuat ekstrapolasi penting—bahwa penolakan Israel terhadap repatriasi adalah konsekuensi logis dari kebijakan yang sejak awal mendorong pengusiran penduduk Arab. [55]  

Ada bukti bahwa para pemimpin Zionis sudah memikirkan penghilangan penduduk asli sebelum peristiwa itu benar-benar terjadi. Pada 7 Februari 1948, Ben-Gurion mengatakan kepada Komite Sentral Mapai (partai politik Zionis terbesar di Palestina): “sangat mungkin bahwa dalam 6, 8, atau 10 bulan mendatang dari perjuangan ini akan terjadi banyak perubahan besar, sangat besar di negara ini dan tidak semuanya merugikan kita, dan pasti ada perubahan besar dalam komposisi penduduk di negeri ini.” [56]  

Childers melihat prinsip dasar Zionisme, yang dengan sendirinya mengecualikan populasi Arab dari masyarakat Zionis, sudah ada sejak awal munculnya ideologi itu. Bisa diperdebatkan apakah langkah-langkah awal yang ia sebutkan memang ditujukan langsung terhadap orang Arab, [57] tetapi jelas bahwa pada 1930-an hingga 1940-an, seruan untuk pemindahan paksa orang Arab dari Palestina sudah dikemukakan oleh kelompok Zionis Revisionis, dan mungkin juga dipertimbangkan oleh faksi yang lebih moderat. [58]  

Hal lain yang tidak bisa dibantah adalah fakta bahwa Resolusi Pembagian 1947 memberikan wilayah kepada negara Yahudi yang penduduknya masih 46 persen Arab. Lebih jauh, sebagian besar tanah itu dimiliki orang Arab. [59] Zionis berargumen bahwa mereka siap membuat pengaturan khusus bagi populasi besar ini; namun sulit membayangkan bagaimana pengaturan tersebut bisa berjalan seiring dengan rencana imigrasi Yahudi skala besar. Terlebih, pada 1 Agustus 1948, pemerintah Israel sudah menyatakan bahwa repatriasi orang Arab “tidak layak secara ekonomi,” sementara pada saat yang sama pengungsi Yahudi mulai masuk ke negara itu dan ditempatkan di tanah Arab yang ditinggalkan. [60]  

Jika tujuan akhir Zionisme adalah mendirikan negara Yahudi homogen di Palestina, atau setidaknya dengan minoritas Arab yang tidak signifikan, maka hampir dapat dipastikan bahwa pimpinan Zionis sampai pada kesimpulan bahwa massa orang Arab Palestina harus disingkirkan dari rumah mereka, baik secara paksa maupun “sukarela.” Karena orang Palestina tidak pernah mempertimbangkan untuk meninggalkan tanah mereka kepada orang asing, Zionis akan sangat termotivasi untuk memaksa mereka pergi. [61]  

Kita bisa mempertanyakan sejauh mana ideologi Zionis berperan dalam tiap fase dan di tiap lokasi eksodus terjadi. Namun, jika dicari kerangka untuk memahami tindakan dan reaksi Zionis, faktor ini harus diberi bobot besar. Lebih jauh, dapat dinyatakan dengan jauh lebih pasti bahwa jika ideologi Zionis tidak secara langsung menyebabkan eksodus, ideologi itu yang membuat persoalan ini tidak pernah terselesaikan. Sebab selama Israel tetap menjadi negara Zionis, penerimaan kembali populasi Palestina dalam jumlah besar adalah sebuah kontradiksi yang tak mungkin diterima.  

[55] Avnery, hlm. 227.  
[56] Ben-Gurion dikutip dalam Gabbay, hlm. 110.  
[57] Childers mengutip larangan Jewish National Fund tahun 1901 terhadap penjualan tanah kepada Arab dan boikot tenaga kerja Arab tahun 1907 sebagai bukti rasisme Zionis terhadap penduduk asli. Hal ini diperdebatkan karena sebagian sejarawan berpendapat kebijakan tersebut lebih ditujukan kepada orang Yahudi sendiri agar tidak berkembang menjadi kelas eksploitatif, bukan langsung terhadap populasi Arab.  
[58] Childers, *The Wordless Wish*, hlm. 166–177.  
[59] Childers, “The Other Exodus,” hlm. 675.  
[60] Kohn, hlm. 872; Childers, *The Wordless Wish*, hlm. 196; dan “The Other Exodus,” hlm. 673.  
[61] Sayegh, hlm. 7; Polk, Stamler, Asfour, hlm. 294.