7. The Nature of Palestinian Society and Palestinian Resistance

The last factor to be analysed is the structure of Arab society, its reaction to the war and its expectations throughout. Although this overview will only touch on the most salient points, it is necessary to take these into consideration, in order to understand how such vast numbers of people could be driven out of their homes and lands.

The first point which must be made is that the clash between the Zionists and the Palestinians was not one of equals. Although the Zionists possessed a smaller population, they made up for this weakness by possessing a better educated and more technologically sophisticated community. More importantly, when the British mandatory administration began to withdraw, the Zionists had ready-made governmental institutions, public services, as well as an army prepared, all of which had been created and developed during the Mandate. These military and administrative organs not only helped to keep the community cohesive but also boosted morale during the conflict.

Within the Arab society, these institutions did not exist in such an advanced form. Many governmental services broke down as the British left Palestine in chaos and this in turn hurt morale. Although steps were taken to counter this disadvantage, they were too late to prevent the outbreak of terror which gripped the Palestinian community. [62] The structure of society was also a factor in the way the exodus was carried out - an all-out war had not been fought for generations in Palestine and many residents, expecting disaster, fled as their villages came under attack. Like other residents had done in past Middle Eastern conflicts, they sought to wait out the attack, and return when the situation had come back to normal. Of course, once they left, the Israelis refused to allow them to return. [63] 

Even more directly related to the origins of the exodus was the type of resistance offered by the Palestinians and by those outside forces which came, according to their statements, to defend the Palestinian people against the Zionists.

A key point to be made is that while the Zionists planned a total war effort, and devoted all their energies to this goal, the Palestinians did not. The nature of Palestinian resistance to both the British and the Zionists in the past had always been in the form of guerrilla strikes, largely spontaneous and centring on the power and influence of the leaders. [64] Once the fighting began, this deficiency was acutely felt, and as the Zionists took the offensive, the lack of a unified Arab central command allowed them to concentrate on their targets selectively. [65] While the failure of military resistance to be effective cannot be blamed for the exodus itself, it is important to note as an ingredient which caused mass panic and terror. [66] 

The Zionists had a further military advantage in that their well-trained and organized army, albeit unofficial, could operate in the months before the Mandate ended, whereas the armies of the Arab states could not enter Palestine until May 15, 1948. When these armies did enter the war, they too, like the indigenous fighters, suffered from a lack of unified command.

62 Khalidi states that government employees were urged by Damascus Radio, April 4, 1948, to stay on the job. On April 24, word came from Damascus that the Arab Higher Committee had decided to transfer its headquarters back into Palestine. Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave? " p. 23. 

63 The nature of Palestinian society and its implications for the exodus are discussed in Gabbay, pp. 86-88; Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Richmond: William Byrd Press, 1956), pp. 7-8; Avnery, pp. 225-26, and Polk, Stamler, Asfour, p. 128.

64 See Sayegh, p. 9, discussing the weaknesses of indigenous military resistance. Also see Musa Alami, pp. 374-79. Alami states, "We had no clear idea of total warfare, but were dominated by the ideas and methods of previous revolts. These had been, in the first instance, popular mass movements of general excitement and enthusiasm. Later there had developed revolutionary groups or bands, but the organization of these groups had been primitive.... When the struggle began, these groups were formed again with the same materials and elements on the same basis and with the same methods: no general support, no regular soldiers, no unity, no totality, no training, no defence, no good arms" (p. 378).

65 Alami, p. 379. "Other places watched what was happening next to them and waited for their turn, and were unable to do anything because of their preoccupation with themselves, the lack of cooperation and of a common command. Thus the country fell, town after town, village after village, position after position, as a result of its fragmentation and lack of unity."

66 Alami, p. 381. "If ultimately the Palestinians evacuated their country, it was not out of cowardice but because they had lost all confidence in the existing system of defence. They had perceived its weakness and realized the disequilibrium between their resources and organization, and that of the Jews." 

7. Sifat Masyarakat Palestina dan Bentuk Perlawanan Palestina  

Faktor terakhir yang perlu dianalisis adalah struktur masyarakat Arab, reaksi mereka terhadap perang, dan harapan-harapan yang mereka miliki sepanjang konflik. Meskipun ulasan ini hanya menyinggung poin-poin utama, hal ini penting dipertimbangkan untuk memahami bagaimana begitu banyak orang dapat diusir dari rumah dan tanah mereka.  

Pertama-tama, bentrokan antara Zionis dan Palestina bukanlah pertarungan yang setara. Meskipun Zionis memiliki jumlah penduduk yang lebih kecil, mereka menutupi kelemahan ini dengan masyarakat yang lebih terdidik dan lebih maju secara teknologi. Yang lebih penting, ketika administrasi mandat Inggris mulai mundur, kaum Zionis sudah memiliki institusi pemerintahan siap pakai, layanan publik, serta tentara yang terlatih. Semua ini dikembangkan selama masa Mandat dan menjadi penopang kekompakan komunitas serta penguat moral selama konflik.  

Dalam masyarakat Arab, institusi semacam itu tidak berkembang dalam bentuk yang sebanding. Banyak layanan pemerintahan runtuh seiring keluarnya Inggris dan hal ini berdampak buruk pada moral publik. Upaya memang dilakukan untuk mengatasi kekurangan ini, tetapi terlalu terlambat untuk mencegah merebaknya teror yang melanda komunitas Palestina. [62] Struktur masyarakat juga memengaruhi cara eksodus berlangsung. Perang besar-besaran belum pernah terjadi selama beberapa generasi di Palestina, sehingga banyak penduduk, ketika desa mereka diserang, memilih mengungsi dengan harapan bisa kembali setelah keadaan normal. Pola ini sama dengan konflik-konflik lain di Timur Tengah. Namun, begitu mereka meninggalkan desa, Israel menolak mengizinkan mereka kembali. [63]  

Lebih jauh, bentuk perlawanan yang dilakukan oleh rakyat Palestina dan pasukan luar yang datang untuk “membela” mereka juga berperan penting dalam asal-usul eksodus.  

Poin kunci adalah bahwa Zionis merencanakan perang total, mengerahkan seluruh energi untuk tujuan itu, sementara Palestina tidak. Bentuk perlawanan Palestina terhadap Inggris maupun Zionis sebelumnya lebih berupa serangan gerilya, spontan, dan berpusat pada kekuatan serta pengaruh para pemimpin. [64] Begitu perang dimulai, kelemahan ini sangat terasa. Ketika Zionis mengambil inisiatif ofensif, ketiadaan komando pusat Arab yang terpadu memungkinkan mereka menyerang sasaran secara selektif. [65] Kegagalan perlawanan militer memang tidak bisa dijadikan alasan tunggal eksodus, tetapi harus dicatat sebagai faktor yang menimbulkan kepanikan dan teror massal. [66]  

Zionis juga memiliki keuntungan militer lain: tentara mereka yang terlatih dan terorganisir, meski belum resmi, sudah bisa beroperasi beberapa bulan sebelum Mandat berakhir. Sementara itu, tentara negara-negara Arab baru bisa masuk Palestina setelah 15 Mei 1948. Ketika akhirnya mereka masuk perang, sama seperti para pejuang lokal, mereka pun menderita akibat kurangnya komando terpadu.  

[62] Khalidi, *Why Did the Palestinians Leave?*, hlm. 23.  
[63] Gabbay, hlm. 86–88; Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*, hlm. 7–8; Avnery, hlm. 225–226; Polk, Stamler, Asfour, hlm. 128.  
[64] Sayegh, hlm. 9; Musa Alami, hlm. 374–379.  
[65] Alami, hlm. 379.  
[66] Alami, hlm. 381.