Additionally, the Israelis possessed the interior lines, and could move about from front to front. Although over 300,000 Palestinians had already been uprooted by the time the Mandate ended, the failure of the Arab armies to secure victory led to still more disasters, as the Israeli forces, now on the offensive, began regularly to expel Arab civilians from newly occupied areas. Outclassed in the levels of training, quality and quantity of arms and essentially split regarding their overall goals, the Arab armies fell back, exposing still more Palestinians to the Israeli assaults. Again, the Arab military failure cannot be cited as a cause for the flight (as some Zionists have done), yet it contributed to the ever increasing sense of hopelessness and resignation, as well as sheer fear and horror which led to further mass flights and expulsions of Palestinian civilians. [67] 

Above all, it must be remembered that although the Israeli victory led to the capture of even more land than the Partition Resolution allowed for, at the time any victory by the Zionists seemed remote, especially to the Arab community in Palestine. Although Zionist propaganda has greatly exaggerated this point, claiming that the Arabs must pay for their bad judgment, it remains to be said that, at least in the early stages, the belief in the ultimate triumph of Arab forces led the population to take some actions, or not take other actions, although they would have reversed these decisions had they realized the eventual disastrous outcome.

In the first phase, most of those who left were wealthy and influential members of the community who had significant property, commercial and professional interests in Palestine. These Palestinians were acting as they had twelve years earlier, when they temporarily left the country to avoid the conflict that was taking place in Palestine at that time. [68] It seems highly unlikely that these individuals, with such a great stake in the life of the community, would have left at all and would have abandoned most of their material possessions, including their houses, had they not expected to return within a month or two. Despite the growing danger of living in a country torn by war, it seems totally improbable that permanent exile would ever have been considered a reasonable price to pay for safety.

As the fighting progressed and efforts to halt the Zionist advances by indigenous resistance, as well as by the Arab Liberation Army, failed, the situation looked increasingly grim. Still, the belief that the combined forces of the Arab states' armies would rescue the country allowed many Palestinians to consider an option they would not have considered had they known the ultimate outcome: namely, temporary evacuation. Again it is incomprehensible that evacuation would have been considered had these civilians not believed that with the entry of these forces, the Zionist advances would be reversed. [69] As Musa Alami observed, "Had the Palestinians been able to foresee their fate, they would have willingly given up all they possessed in order to preserve their country and avoid their exodus and dispersal.” [70] 

As the Israeli offensive increased, more and more civilians were uprooted, either through direct expulsions or by Israeli-inspired terror tactics. The inhabitants fled, usually retreating with the Arab armed forces, but still convinced that once the tide turned, they could return to their former homes. Only when the armistices were signed did it become evident that return was not imminent. [71] Even so, many Palestinians tried to get back across the new frontier to their former homes. The Palestinian people as a whole, to this day, have refused to abandon the hope of ultimately returning to Palestine.

In summary, while the nature of Palestinian society and Palestinian resistance cannot be held responsible for the exodus, one needs to under- stand it in order to fully comprehend how such a vast number of persons could be driven from their homes. In evaluating it we can get a better idea of the makeup of the combatants and the background to the mass exodus which took place.

67 The weaknesses of the Arab armies are discussed in Polk, Stamler, Asfour, pp. 129 and 286, and Alami, pp. 382-87.

68 Gabbay, p. 65. During the 1936-39 rebellion, 40,000 Palestinians left the country, returning when the fighting subsided. 

69 See Alami, p. 381; also Fauzi al-Qawuqji, "Memoirs, 1948" in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. I, No. 4 (1972), p. 49, and Nazzal, p. 221. Discussing the exodus from Tiberias, Nazzal remarks: "They had also heard of the promised entry of the Arab armies into Palestine, and they expected a speedy Arab victory. Why should they risk death during the siege when they could leave now and return home in a month's time, upon the Arab victory in Palestine? "

70 Alami, p. 387.

71 Avnery, p. 226. 

Selain itu, Israel memiliki keuntungan berupa jalur interior, yang memungkinkan mereka bergerak dari satu front ke front lain. Walaupun lebih dari 300.000 orang Palestina sudah terusir pada saat Mandat berakhir, kegagalan tentara Arab meraih kemenangan membawa bencana lebih lanjut. Ketika pasukan Israel beralih ke posisi ofensif, mereka secara rutin mulai mengusir warga sipil Arab dari wilayah yang baru diduduki. Tentara Arab, yang kalah dalam hal pelatihan, kualitas dan kuantitas senjata, serta terpecah dalam tujuan mereka, akhirnya mundur. Hal ini membuat lebih banyak lagi rakyat Palestina terpapar serangan Israel. Sekali lagi, kegagalan militer Arab tidak bisa dijadikan alasan utama eksodus (sebagaimana klaim Zionis), tetapi hal ini jelas menambah rasa putus asa, ketidakberdayaan, serta ketakutan yang berujung pada gelombang pengungsian dan pengusiran massal. [67]  

Yang terpenting, perlu diingat bahwa meskipun kemenangan Israel akhirnya menghasilkan perebutan wilayah lebih luas daripada yang diberikan dalam Resolusi Pembagian, pada saat itu kemenangan Zionis sama sekali tidak terlihat mungkin, terutama bagi masyarakat Arab Palestina. Propaganda Zionis telah melebih-lebihkan hal ini dengan mengklaim bahwa bangsa Arab harus membayar mahal atas kesalahan mereka, tetapi kenyataannya, pada tahap awal, keyakinan bahwa pasukan Arab pada akhirnya akan menang membuat rakyat Palestina mengambil tindakan tertentu—atau mengabaikan tindakan lain—yang mungkin tidak akan mereka pilih jika mengetahui hasil tragis yang menanti.  

Pada fase pertama, sebagian besar yang pergi adalah kaum kaya dan berpengaruh yang memiliki tanah, bisnis, serta kepentingan profesional di Palestina. Mereka bertindak sebagaimana 12 tahun sebelumnya, ketika meninggalkan negara itu sementara untuk menghindari konflik tahun 1936–1939. [68] Sangat kecil kemungkinan bahwa kelompok dengan kepentingan sebesar ini akan meninggalkan rumah dan harta benda mereka secara permanen, termasuk rumah tinggal, jika mereka tidak memperkirakan akan kembali dalam satu atau dua bulan. Meskipun bahaya hidup di negara yang dilanda perang kian nyata, sangat sulit dipercaya bahwa pengasingan permanen dianggap sebagai harga yang pantas untuk keselamatan.  

Seiring berlanjutnya pertempuran dan gagalnya perlawanan lokal maupun pasukan Arab Liberation Army menghentikan kemajuan Zionis, situasi menjadi semakin suram. Namun, keyakinan bahwa gabungan tentara negara-negara Arab akan datang menyelamatkan Palestina membuat banyak rakyat memilih opsi yang tak akan mereka pilih jika mereka tahu hasil akhirnya: evakuasi sementara. Sulit dipahami bahwa orang-orang ini akan mengungsi jika mereka tidak percaya bahwa begitu tentara Arab masuk, kemajuan Zionis akan dipatahkan. [69] Seperti yang diamati Musa Alami, “Seandainya rakyat Palestina dapat meramalkan nasib mereka, mereka akan rela melepaskan seluruh yang mereka miliki demi menjaga tanah air dan menghindari eksodus serta penyebaran mereka.” [70]  

Ketika serangan Israel makin intensif, semakin banyak warga sipil yang terusir, baik melalui pengusiran langsung maupun taktik teror yang diilhami Israel. Warga melarikan diri, biasanya mengikuti jalur mundur pasukan Arab, tetapi tetap yakin bahwa setelah keadaan berbalik, mereka akan bisa kembali ke rumah mereka. Baru setelah perjanjian gencatan senjata ditandatangani, menjadi jelas bahwa kepulangan tidak akan segera terjadi. [71] Meski demikian, banyak orang Palestina tetap berusaha menyeberangi perbatasan baru untuk kembali ke rumah mereka. Hingga kini, bangsa Palestina secara keseluruhan menolak melepaskan harapan untuk kembali ke tanah air mereka.  

Sebagai kesimpulan, meskipun sifat masyarakat Palestina dan bentuk perlawanan mereka tidak bisa dijadikan alasan utama eksodus, pemahaman terhadap faktor-faktor ini penting untuk menjelaskan bagaimana begitu banyak orang bisa diusir dari rumahnya. Dengan mengevaluasi hal ini, kita bisa melihat lebih jelas komposisi pihak yang berperang serta latar belakang terjadinya eksodus massal tersebut.  

[67] Polk, Stamler, Asfour, hlm. 129, 286; Alami, hlm. 382–387.  
[68] Gabbay, hlm. 65. Selama pemberontakan 1936–1939, sebanyak 40.000 orang Palestina meninggalkan negara itu dan kembali setelah pertempuran mereda.  
[69] Alami, hlm. 381; Fauzi al-Qawuqji, *Memoirs, 1948*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. I, No. 4 (1972), hlm. 49; Nazzal, hlm. 221.  
[70] Alami, hlm. 387.  
[71] Avnery, hlm. 226.