Some positive evidence supporting the Zionist claims does exist, although it is not very extensive. The Zionists maintain that efforts were made to persuade the Arabs to stay via radio appeals and even leafleting of villages, in the early phase of the war. [16] Zionist efforts to convince the Arab population of Haifa and Zichron Ya'akov to stay were also made, in this case because Arab labour was seen as vital to maintaining the economies of these places. [17] 

Interestingly enough, some of the strongest evidence for the Arab position comes from Zionist Israeli sources. This is more clearly understood when one examines the intended audience: pro-Zionist writers in the West are addressing an indifferent or hostile reading public and will offer no evidence which may prejudice their case. Books published in Israel, written in Hebrew, are aimed primarily at the domestic audience, and tend to be considerably franker. Thus we can cite Yigal Allon's description of Palmacb plans to force the exodus of Galilean Arabs:

The long battle had weakened our forces and before us stood great duties of blocking the routes of the Arab invasion. We therefore looked for means which did not force us into employing force, in order to cause the tens of thousands of sulky Arabs who remained in the Galilee to flee, for in case of an Arab invasion they were likely to strike us in the rear.

I gathered all the Jewish mukhtars who had contact with Arabs in different villages, and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs that a great Jewish reinforcement had arrived in Galilee and that it was going to burn all the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time. [18] 

More recently, Yitzhak Rabin published his memoirs in which he described the Israeli conquest of Lod (Lydda):

We walked outside, Ben-Gurion accompanying. us. Allon repeated his question "What is to be done with the population? " B.G. waved his hand in a gesture which said "Drive them out! "

Allon and I held a consultation. I agreed that it was essential to drive the inhabitants out. We took them on foot towards the Bet Horon road, assuming that the legion would be obliged to look after them, thereby shouldering logistic difficulties which would burden its fighting capacity, making things easier for us.... The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion. [19] 

In examining these sources on their merits, that is whether they provide positive evidence rather than disputing other evidence and whether the quotes are in keeping with the tenor of the source from which it is quoted, we find that there is more material to support the Palestinian view of history than the Zionist view. To be sure, each historian will have to weigh these materials by his own standards, but it would seem that taken in isolation, the sources themselves give more credence to the theory that the Palestinians were made to leave, either directly or indirectly expelled, rather than to the Zionist claim that the orders of Arab leaders induced the exodus. A more carefully defined exploration of these positions will be made in the next section, which presents the thesis that the exodus must be viewed in three distinct phases, each with different factors and motivations in operation.

17 See David Cairnes, letter to the editor, in The Spectator, No. 6940, June 30, 1961, p. 950. The Zionist claim has always rested to a great degree on what transpired in Haifa. The dramatic appeal by the Jewish mayor to persuade the inhabitants to remain is cited as representative of the positive intentions of the Zionists. While this appeal was no doubt genuine, it would seem to have been atypical as regards the rest of Palestine, and must also be viewed in the total context of the battle for Haifa. See Childers, "The Wordless Wish," p. 190. 

18 Allon, former commander of the Palmach, is quoted in Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet - The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," in Middle East Forum, Vol. XXXVII, No. 9 (1961), p. 28, and Childers, "The Wordless Wish," p. 192.

19 This portion of Rabin's memoirs, censored in the official edition, was published in the New York Times (October 23, 1979) and was reprinted in Palestine Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 6 (October 1979), p. 11. 

Ada beberapa bukti positif yang mendukung klaim Zionis, meskipun jumlahnya tidak banyak. Zionis berpendapat bahwa mereka telah berusaha membujuk orang Arab agar tetap tinggal melalui siaran radio dan bahkan penyebaran selebaran ke desa-desa pada fase awal perang. [16] Upaya Zionis untuk meyakinkan penduduk Arab di Haifa dan Zichron Ya’akov agar tetap tinggal juga dilakukan, karena tenaga kerja Arab dianggap penting untuk menjaga perekonomian di daerah tersebut. [17]  

Menariknya, beberapa bukti terkuat yang mendukung posisi Arab justru datang dari sumber-sumber Zionis Israel sendiri. Hal ini lebih mudah dipahami jika kita melihat siapa audiens yang dituju. Penulis pro-Zionis di Barat menyasar publik pembaca yang acuh atau bahkan bermusuhan, sehingga mereka tidak akan memberikan bukti yang bisa merugikan posisi mereka. Sementara buku-buku yang diterbitkan di Israel, ditulis dalam bahasa Ibrani, lebih ditujukan kepada audiens domestik dan cenderung lebih blak-blakan.  

Contohnya, Yigal Allon, mantan komandan Palmach, menggambarkan rencana untuk memaksa eksodus orang Arab Galilea:

“Pertempuran panjang telah melemahkan pasukan kami dan di depan kami ada tugas besar untuk memblokir jalur invasi Arab. Karena itu kami mencari cara yang tidak memaksa kami menggunakan kekuatan, untuk membuat puluhan ribu orang Arab muram yang masih tinggal di Galilea melarikan diri, karena jika terjadi invasi Arab mereka mungkin akan menyerang kami dari belakang.  

Saya mengumpulkan semua mukhtar Yahudi yang punya kontak dengan orang Arab di berbagai desa, dan meminta mereka membisikkan kepada sebagian orang Arab bahwa pasukan besar Yahudi telah tiba di Galilea dan akan membakar semua desa di Huleh. Mereka harus menyarankan kepada orang-orang Arab ini, sebagai teman, untuk melarikan diri selagi masih ada waktu.” [18]  

Lebih baru, Yitzhak Rabin dalam memoarnya menggambarkan penaklukan Israel atas Lod (Lydda):

“Kami berjalan keluar, Ben-Gurion mendampingi kami. Allon mengulang pertanyaannya: ‘Apa yang harus dilakukan dengan penduduk?’ B.G. mengibaskan tangannya dengan isyarat yang artinya ‘Usir mereka!’  

Allon dan saya berdiskusi. Saya setuju bahwa penting untuk mengusir penduduk. Kami mengiring mereka berjalan kaki menuju jalan Bet Horon, dengan perkiraan bahwa legion harus mengurus mereka, sehingga menanggung beban logistik yang akan melemahkan kemampuan tempurnya dan memudahkan kami.... Penduduk Lod tidak pergi dengan sukarela. Tidak ada cara lain selain menggunakan kekerasan dan tembakan peringatan untuk memaksa mereka berjalan sejauh 10 hingga 15 mil ke titik di mana mereka bertemu dengan legion.” [19]  

Menilai sumber-sumber ini dari isinya—apakah menghadirkan bukti positif, bukan sekadar membantah bukti lain, dan apakah kutipan sesuai dengan maksud sumber aslinya—kita menemukan lebih banyak materi yang mendukung pandangan sejarah Palestina daripada pandangan Zionis. Tentu setiap sejarawan harus menimbang bukti-bukti ini dengan standar mereka masing-masing, tetapi secara umum dapat disimpulkan bahwa sumber-sumber tersebut lebih kuat mendukung teori bahwa orang Palestina dipaksa pergi, baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, daripada klaim Zionis bahwa eksodus terjadi karena perintah pemimpin Arab.  

Penjelajahan yang lebih terperinci akan dilakukan pada bagian berikutnya, yang menyajikan tesis bahwa eksodus harus dipandang dalam tiga fase berbeda, masing-masing dengan faktor dan motivasi yang berbeda pula.  

[17] David Cairnes, surat kepada redaksi, *The Spectator*, No. 6940, 30 Juni 1961, hlm. 950. Klaim Zionis banyak bertumpu pada peristiwa di Haifa. Seruan dramatis wali kota Yahudi agar penduduk tetap tinggal sering dikutip sebagai bukti niat baik Zionis. Meski seruan itu mungkin tulus, tampaknya hal tersebut tidak mewakili keseluruhan Palestina, dan harus dilihat dalam konteks pertempuran Haifa. Lihat Childers, “The Wordless Wish,” hlm. 190.  
[18] Yigal Allon dikutip dalam Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet - The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” *Middle East Forum*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 9 (1961), hlm. 28, dan Childers, “The Wordless Wish,” hlm. 192.  
[19] Bagian memoar Rabin ini, yang disensor dalam edisi resmi, diterbitkan di *New York Times* (23 Oktober 1979) dan dicetak ulang dalam *Palestine Perspectives*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (Oktober 1979), hlm. 11.